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The end of the Cold War led to a substantial decline in defense product demand. This study investigates 
the effects of product demand decline on defense firms’ investments in R&D for innovations. Our 
evidence indicates significant lower levels of R&D intensity for the low demand period (1993 to 1998) 
than for the high demand period (1984 to 1989). We also find significant declines in the defense firms' 
return on assets over the period, which is mainly attributable to a significant decrease in the firms' 
efficiency of using assets to produce sales. The defense firms, despite decline in defense product sales, 
generally maintained their total sales by partially shifting their capacity to commercial markets, which 
might be at the sacrifice of profitability, operating efficiency, and R&D investments for innovations. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the organizational decline literature, researchers debate on whether the decline in product demand 
will inhibit or stimulate the innovations of an organization (e.g., the review by Mone, McKinley, and 
Barker, 1998). One stream of studies contends that organizational decline including product demand 
decline would inhibit innovations. Resource scarcity due to product demand decline restricts information 
processing of an organization and imposes an urgency to conserve resources, which leads to 
organizational rigidity and undermines its capacity to innovate (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981; 
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim, 1987; D’Aunno and Sutton, 1992; Ocasio, 1995; Barker and Mone, 1998). 
In contrast, the other stream of studies suggests that product demand decline could serve as a stimulus for 
innovations. They contend that poorer performance caused by product demand decline pressures an 
organization to be more risk-seeking in its investment decisions, and motivates it to search for innovative 
solutions for improving its performance (Miles and Cameron, 1982; Cameron, 1983; Lant, Milliken, and 
Batra, 1992; Haveman, 1993; Hundley, Jacobson, and Park, 1996; Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996).  
The end of the Cold War in 1989 led to a substantial decline in US defense procurement spending. US 
Defense procurement from the defense industry had declined from more than 120 billion for 1984 to 
around 45 billion for 1998, both in constant 1999 US dollars (the Department of Defense, Green Book 
1999). The defense industry during 1980s-1990s provides a natural context to investigate the effects of 
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product demand decline.  Thus, the purpose of this study is to empirically examine the effects of declining 
product demand during 1980s-1990s on R&D investments of US defense-contracting firms. The evidence 
provided by this study helps to test which of the competing views could better explain the US defense 
industry’s response to the declining demand subsequent to the end of the Cold War. 
The declining demand for defense products substantially deteriorated the operating environment of 
US defense firms (Lundquist, 1992). There have been extensive discussions on defense firms’ strategy 
alternatives for rapidly declining demand in defense markets (Lundquist, 1992; Minnich, 1993; Dial and 
Murphy, 1995; Gholz and Sapolsky, 2000). The strategies adopted by major defense contractors include 
“acquisitions to achieve critical mass; diversification into nondefense areas, or converting defense 
operations to commercial products and services; globalization, i.e., finding international markets for 
defense operations; downsizing and consolidation; and exit” (Dial and Murphy, 1995, page 293). 
However, there is little evidence on the defense industry’s strategic responses to the decline in defense 
products demand, and the effect on their investments in innovations. Our study intends to close this gap in 
the literature. 
We believe the paper has importance to R&D researchers, as it finds that a substantial decline in 
product demand could significantly undermine firms’ motivation and capacity for R&D investments for 
innovations. Keeping a R&D lead in developing advanced defense products is a critical strategy for the 
U.S. national security (Rogerson, 1989). This study could provide evidence helpful to assess the trends in 
defense R&D investments for innovations. Many technological innovations initially developed for 
military purposes have been later adapted for commercial purposes. Software and the internet are two 
classical examples (Campbell-Kelly, 2003). These technological innovations developed by the defense 
industry have since become critical to competitive advantages of the US economy. Thus, the effect of 
product demand decline on R&D investments for innovations of defense contractors could have 
implications beyond the area of national security. With the Great Recession since 2008 and subsequent 
deleveraging of U. S. customers, our study could also be relevant to the current issues in general with 
R&D investments in the U.S. 
The organization of the remaining of this study is as follows. Section 2 develops the major 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample firms and data characteristics. Section 4 presents the empirical 
evidence. Section 5 concludes with a summary and implications of the findings. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
One body of organizational decline research suggests that product demand declines would inhibit 
innovations of an organization. Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) develop a theoretical model on the 
effect of external “threat” on organizational behavior. They define threat as “an adverse condition in the 
environmental, such as resources scarcity, competition, or reduction in the size of the market” (page 515). 
Their model, called by them “threat-rigidity effects”, suggests that threat could affect organizational 
behavior in three ways. First, it restricts an organization’s capacity for processing information, and results 
in a lower number of innovative alternatives to be considered. Second, threat increases an organization’s 
concern with improving control and coordination of organizational activities, which generally leads to 
centralization of authority and more formalized procedures. Third, resource scarcity due to the 
environmental adversity imposes an urgency to conserve resources through cost cutting and results in a 
“dominance of efficiency concerns”. All these lead to more rigidity in organizational behavior, which 
consequently inhibits organizational innovations. The theoretical model of “threat-rigidity effects” have 
been supported by empirical evidence from studies such as Sutton and D’Aunno (1989), D’Aunno and 
Sutton (1992), Ocasio (1995), and Barker and Mone (1998). Based on this stream of research, we expect 
that defense product demand decline subsequent to the end of the Cold War would decrease defense 
contractors’ innovations. We call this “inhibiting view”.  
R&D intensity is commonly used as a proxy for R&D investments for innovations in prior research. 
Thus, the general method we use to test for a change in R&D investments involves a comparison of 
defense firms’ R&D intensity for the high demand (1984-1989) and the low demand (1993-1998) period. 
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A decrease in R&D intensity, vis-à-vis nondefense firms in the same industry, reflects the decreased 
investment in R&D by defense firms. We provide the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: Industry-adjusted R&D intensity for defense firms during the low-demand period 
(1993-1998) was lower than that during the high-demand period (1984-1989). 
 
In contrast with the inhibiting view, some studies on organizational decline suggest that external 
threat could serve as a stimulator for organizational innovations. This stream of research, based on 
organizational learning or prospect theories, contends that organizational decline such as lower financial 
performance, makes organizations to be more risk-seeking for changes or adaptations (Singh, 1986; 
Bromiley, 1991; Haveman, 1993; Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996), and consequently stimulates managers 
to search out innovative solutions to problems of their organizations (Miles and Cameron, 1982; Lant, 
Milliken, and Batra, 1992). The organizational learning theory suggests that organizations are more 
tended to change and adapt “when their performance is below aspiration level, or perceived as failure” 
(Lant and Mezias, 1992). Firms are more likely to incur performance below aspiration when facing a 
substantial decline in product demand. According to the prospect theory, decision makers tend to be more 
risk- averse “in choices involving sure gains” whereas to be more “risk seeking in choices involving sure 
losses” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Following this line of research, the severe decline in defense 
product demand could motivate defense firms to engage in riskier R&D projects as a way to gain 
competitive advantage in the more challenging defense or commercial product markets. Both the 
organizational learning and the prospect theories suggests that defense firm would be more motivated to 
engage in innovation activities for surviving the intensified competition resulted from the decline in 
defense product demand. Based on this stimulating view, we provide the following hypothesis: 
 
H1b: Industry-adjusted R&D intensity for defense firms during the low-demand period 
(1993-1998) was higher than that during the high-demand period (1984-1989).  
 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
Following McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002), our sample period is from 1984 to 1989 for the period of 
high demand for defense product, and from 1993 to1998 for the period of low demand for defense 
product. We consider 1990 to 1992 as the transition period from high to low demand since most defense 
contracts last for more than one year, and many defense contractors might begin to have substantial 
declines in defense sales a few years later than the declines in the awarded volume of contracts 
(Lundquist, 1992). The low demand sample period ends with 1998 because most firms stopped reporting 
segment sales to the government subsequent to 1998 due to the change in disclosure requirements on 
segment reporting by the SEC in January1999 (SEC Final Rule 33-7620).  
Our initial sample is 56 firms (or their parent companies) included in the annual DOD report, 100 
Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards of 1989, with nonzero sales 
to the U. S. government included in Compustat segment files of 1989.1 Please refer to the Appendix for 
the list of the sample firms. The majority of firms with defense sales also made sales to commercial 
markets. We examine R&D investments at the firm level, instead of segment level, because the data for 
R&D expenses are available only at the firm level for most sample firms. Another reason is that 
operations of government and commercial business are difficult to be clearly separated due to the 
existence of “externalities” (Bohi 1973) and “cost shifting” (Rogerson 1992; Lichtenberg 1992). We deal 
with this issue in our regression analysis by including defense dependence, the government sales as a 
percentage of total sales, as a control variable. 
We report sample breakdowns by industry in Table 1, Panel A. Most of the sample defense firms 
(86% of the 56 firms) concentrate in manufacturing industries with four-digit SIC codes from 2000 to 
3999. We report sample breakdowns by year in Table 1, Panel B. Facing with declining product demand, 
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some defense firms could be delisted due to mergers & acquisitions or even bankruptcies. Thus, the 
number of the sample firms decreased from 56 in 1989 to 42 in 1998.  
 
TABLE 1 
PANEL A: INDUSTRY BREAKDOWN FOR SAMPLE FIRMS OF 1989 
 
  First two digits of  
Industry SIC codes Number Percentage 
Building construction contractors 15 1         1.8% 
Chemicals & allied products 28 3         5.4% 
Primary metals 33 1         1.8% 
Fabricated metal products 34 2         3.6% 
Industrial and commercial machinery 
 and computer equipment 35 7 12.5% 
Electronic and other electrical equipment 36 5         8.9% 
Transportation equipment 37 23 41.1% 
Measuring, analyzing and controlling 
 instruments 38 7 12.5% 
Communication services 48 1 1.8% 
Wholesale durable goods 50 1 1.8% 
Business services 73 2 3.6% 
Services-engineering, accounting, 
 research, and management 87 3 5.4% 
Total   56 100% 
 
PANEL B: YEAR BREAKDOWN FOR SAMPLE FIRMS 
 
 High-Demand Period Low-Demand Period  
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Firms 52 54 54 55 55 56 52 50 48 46 44 42 608 
 
 
The substantial decline in demand for defense products posted a challenging operating environment 
for US defense industry. As Lundquist (1992) pointed out, “The cuts will be deeper and longer than any 
in our history, deeper and longer than anyone in Washington or industry wants to admit. The cuts will 
force industry to retrench because they will reduce revenue by a greater margin than defense contractors 
can make up through globalization, diversification, or commercialization.”  To have an overview of the 
effects of declining product demand subsequent to 1989 on operating environment of defense industry, 
our empirical examination covers the defense firms’ profitability, capital intensity, financial flexibility, 
and operating efficiency variables, in addition to R&D investment variables. Firms in different industries 
exhibit different operating and financial characteristics. Thus, we examine these variables both without 
adjustment and being adjusted by their respective industry medians.  For each of those variables, the 
industry-adjusted measure for each sample year is the difference between a firm and the median of 
Compustat firms that have the same first two digits of SIC codes with the firm. The definitions for the 
financial, efficiency and innovations variables used in our empirical examination are included in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable     Definition____________________________________ 
Profitability Variables:  
NI/AT:  return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets at the end of fiscal  
year. 
NI/SALE: return on sale, measured as net income divided by net sales. 
Financial Flexibility Variables: 
DT/AT: debt leverage, measured as total liability divided by total assets. 
CHE/AT: financial resources,  measured as cash and short-term investments divided by total  
assets. 
Capital Intensity Variables: 
PPENT/AT: capital intensity, measured as net book value of property, plant, and  
equipment divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year. 
CAPX/SALE: capital intensity, measured as capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by net sales. 
Operating Efficiency Variables: 
SALE/AT: efficiency of assets to produce sales, measured as net sales divided by total  
assets at the end of fiscal year. 
SALE/PPENT: efficiency of plant assets to produce sales, measured as net sales divided by net  
property, plant & equipment assets at the end of fiscal year. 
SALE/EMP: efficiency of employees to produce sales, measured as net sales divided by  
number of employees at the end of fiscal year. 
NI/EMP: efficiency of employees to produce profits, measured as net income divided by  
number of employees at the end of fiscal year. 
Innovations Investments Variables: 
RD/AT: research and development intensity, measured as research and development  
expenses scaled by total assets. 
RD/SALE: research and development intensity, measured as research and development  
expenses scaled by net sales. 
RD/S&GA: research and development intensity, measured as research and development  
expenses scaled by selling and general administrative expenses. 
Other Variables: 
GovSal: sales made by a firm to the domestic government  
SALE:  control variable for the size effect, measured by net sales in millions of 1998   
constant dollar . 
Post:  a dummy variable. It equals 1 if a firm year is during 1993 to 1998 (i.e.,  
post the defense product demand decline), and equals 0 if a firm year is  
during 1984 to 1989 (i.e., pre the demand decline).   
Control: a dummy variable, which equals 1 if a firm is one of the non-defense firms in the   
control group; otherwise, if a firm is one of the sample defense firms, it equals 0.  
Defense: the degree to which a defense firm depends on government contracts for its 
Dependence: sales, measured as sales to domestic government divided by net sales  
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Evidence for Defense Firms' Financial and Operational Characteristics 
To provide evidence on changes in the operating environment of defense industry, we first compared 
profitability, total sale, defense sales, and employment of defense firms for high-demand period (1984-
1989) and for low-demand period (1993 to 1998). We use non-parametric tests, median tests, for the 
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comparisons instead of mean tests because the financial and operational variables usually are not 
normally distributed. The results are reported in Table 3, Panel A. We found that median defense firms 
earned a significantly lower return on assets for both unadjusted (χ2=5.24, p<0.05) and industry-adjusted 
returns (χ2=20.74, p<0.01) during the low-demand period, but had no significant change in return on sales 
over the period. For median defense firms, the defense sales for the low-demand period (1993-1998) are 
less in amounts (in 1998 constant dollars, χ2=30.58, p<0.01) and consist of a lower percentage of their 
total sales (χ2=16.53, p<0.01) than for the high-demand period (1984 to 1989). Although the median 
amount of total sales (in 1998 constant dollars) declined from $4,936 million to $4,352 million, the 
change is not statistically significant for the median tests (χ2=1.30, p>0.10). The results suggest that the 
defense firms partially compensate their loss of sales from defense products by making more sales to their 
commercial markets or foreign markets. The median number of employees for the sample defense firms 
declined significantly from 37,966 to 28,500 (χ2=2.94, p<0.10). Additionally, the substantial decline in 
defense product demand seemed to have significantly undermined defense firms' financial flexibility. The 
median defense firm exhibited significantly higher debt leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets, for both unadjusted (χ2=5.20, p<0.05) and industry-adjusted measures (χ2=4.49, p<0.05). As 
for financial resources measured by cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets, the industry-
adjusted measure exhibited a significant decrease in median (χ2=5.19, p<0.05) although no significant 
change in unadjusted measure. Our findings indicate that the product demand declines after 1989 had a 
substantial negative effect on the sample defense firms’ profitability and operations.  
With the decline in products demand, one strategy predicted by theories that could be adopted by 
defense firms is to substantially lower its investment level, called “milking or harvesting the investment” 
(Perry, 1986). We examined the defense firms’ capital intensity using two measures, net property, plant, 
and equipment divided by total assets (PPENT/AT) and capital expenditures divided by net sales 
(CAPX/SALE). The results are also reported in Table 3, Panel A. The median defense firm experienced a 
significant decline in both the unadjusted and the industry-adjusted capital intensity measures. The results 
indicate that consistent with the theories, the defense firms indeed cut capital investments as a response to 
the declining defense product demand.    
Prior studies suggest that firm managers have strong incentives to maintain the size of their firms, and 
could delay downsizing and restructuring to the declined product demands at the cost of operating 
efficiency (Dial and Murphy, 1995; Sanders, 2001). To investigate the defense firms’ operating 
efficiency, we compared medians of total asset sale efficiency (net sale/total assets), plant asset sale 
efficiency (net sales/net property, plant, & equipment), employee sale efficiency (net sales /number of 
employees), and employee profit efficiency (income before extraordinary items /number of employees) 
for the high- and low-demand period. The results are reported in Table 3, Panel B. The median defense 
firm experienced a significant decline in efficiency of assets to produce sales for both the unadjusted 
(χ2=15.24, p<0.01) and the industry-adjusted measure (χ2=13.99, p<0.01) from the high- to low-demand 
period. According to the DuPont Model, a firm's return on assets can be represented by its return on sale 
multiplied by its efficiency of using assets to produce sales (NI/AT =NI/Sale × Sale/AT). Thus, the 
change of NI/AT can result from changes in NI/Sale and/or changes in Sale/AT. Our evidence suggests 
that the significant decline in defense firms' median return on assets, as reported in Table 3, Panel A, can 
be mainly attributable to deterioration in their efficiency of using assets to produce sales since there is no 
significant change in defense firms' median return on sales.  For a firm's efficiency of using plant assets to 
produce sales, we found no significant change in the median. For efficiency of employee to produce sales, 
the median defense firms improved from $139.37 thousand to $166.43 thousand for unadjusted measure 
(χ2=32.72, p<0.01) over the period. For industry-adjusted efficiency of employee to produce sales, 
however, the defense firms experienced no significant change in the median (χ2=0.81, n. s.). The results 
are similar for efficiency of employee to produce income. The results indicate that although defense firms 
improved their employee efficiency to produce sales and income over the period, the improvement was 
not better than what were achieved by their peer firms operating in the respective industries.  Our 
evidence suggests that the defense firms in general cut their capital investments and workforce to adapt to 
the substantially lower demand for their defense products. But some of them might have not shrunk  
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TABLE 3  
RESULTS FOR MEDIAN TESTS 
Panel A:  
Variables 
High-demand 
(median) 
Low-demand 
(median) 
Median Tests      
        (χ2) 
 
Profitability      
Return on Sale (NI/SALE) n=326 n=282   
Unadjusted 0.0417 0.0433 0.24 
Industry-Adjusted 0.0127 0.0109 0.60 
       
Return on Assets (NI/AT) n=326 n=282   
Unadjusted 0.0578 0.0477   5.24** 
Industry-Adjusted 0.0229 0.0057 20.74*** 
       
Total Asset, Sale, and Government Sale n=326 n=282   
Total Assets (AT) b 4185.1 3916.9  0.03 
Total Sale (SALE)b 4936.2 4351.9  1.30 
Government Sale (GovSal)b 1416.4 681.01  30.58*** 
Government Sale/Total sale (GovSal/SALE) 0.3740 0.2090 16.53*** 
       
Employment n=322 n=281   
Number of employees (EMP) 37966 28500  2.94* 
    
Financial flexibility    
Debt leverage (DT/AT) n=326 N=280  
Unadjusted 0.1780 0.2076 5.20** 
Industry-Adjusted -0.0388 -0.0095 4.49** 
    
Financial resources (CHE/AT) n=326 n=282  
Unadjusted 0.0492 0.0474 0.11 
Industry-Adjusted -0.0200 -0.0322 5.19** 
    
Capital Intensity      
PPENT/AT n=326 n=282   
Unadjusted 0.2873 0.2425 9.55*** 
Industry-Adjusted 0.0591 0.0413 5.19** 
       
CAPX/SALE n=322 n=278   
Unadjusted 0.0488 0.0390  18.12*** 
Industry-Adjusted 0.0073 0.0004  8.96*** 
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Panel B:  
Variable 
High-demand 
(median) 
Low-demand 
(median) 
Median Tests 
        (χ2) 
Operating Efficiency      
Asset Efficiency (SALE/AT) n=326 n=282   
Unadjusted 1.3407 1.1847 15.24*** 
Industry-Adjusted 0.0709 -0.0739 13.99*** 
    
Plant Asset Efficiency (PPENT/AT) n=326 n=282  
Unadjusted 4.4246 4.6394 0.66 
Industry-Adjusted -0.5136 -0.6939 1.30 
       
Employee Sale Efficiency (SALE/EMP)a n=322 n=281   
Unadjusted 139.37 166.43 32.72*** 
Industry-Adjusted 9.2938 12.398 0.81 
       
Employee Profit Efficiency (NI/EMP)a n=322 n=281   
Unadjusted 5.6051 6.7573 6.41** 
Industry-Adjusted 1.7122 1.6583 0.01 
       
R&D Intensity      
R&D/AT n=288 n=255   
Unadjusted 0.0421 0.0301   9.60*** 
Industry-Adjusted 0.0051 -0.0038 10.21***    
    
R&D/SALE n=288 n=255   
Unadjusted 0.0323 0.0254   5.81** 
Industry-Adjusted 0.0067 -0.0036 11.26*** 
      
R&D/S&GA n=275 n=235   
Unadjusted 0.2040 0.1829 4.93** 
Industry-Adjusted 0.0582 0.0389   4.17** 
    
*, **, *** represent significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
a. Employee sale and profit efficiency variables are in thousands of 1998 constant dollar.  
b. Amounts of total sale and government sale are in millions of 1998 constant dollar. 
 
sufficiently. Given the evidence of no significant change in median net sales and total assets from the high 
demand to the low demand period in spite of a significant decline in defense sales (refer to Table 3, Panel 
A), the results suggest that many manufacturing defense firms responded to defense product demand 
declines by partially shifting or diversifying their resources to commercial business. Being successful 
with the commercial markets requires defense firms to utilize new skills such as marketing and sales. And 
relative to commercial firms, defense firms tend to have high cost structures and low operating 
efficiencies due to longtime serving the government. Therefore, defense firms, in the process of 
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commercialization or diversification, could be forced to enter unfamiliar territories, and suffer lower 
efficiency and profitability (Lundquist, 1992; Anand and Singh, 1997). 
 
Evidence for Testing the Hypotheses 
Results from Median Tests 
Following prior studies (e.g., Hitt et al. 1996; Lev and Sougiannis 1996), we use R&D intensity as a 
proxy for R&D investments for innovations, which is generally measured as reported R&D expenses 
divided by net sales of a firm.2 Large fluctuations of a firm’s net sales could result in substantial 
variations in the measure of R&D divided by total sale, which does not necessarily represent significant 
changes in R&D activities. To mitigate potential bias from this, we also examined two additional 
variables for a firm’s R&D intensity: reported R&D expenses divided by total assets and R&D expenses 
divided by selling and administrative expenses. A firm’s total assets are generally more stable than its net 
sales. Selling and administrative expenses of a firm are usually more stable than its net sales due to the 
short-term “stickiness” of these expenses. The results of median tests are reported in Table 3, Panel B. 
From the high-demand to the low-demand period, the median of R&D over net sales (R&D/SALE) 
significantly decreased from 0.0323 to 0.0254 for the unadjusted measure ((χ2=5.81, p<0.05), and from 
0.0067 to -0.0036 for the industry-adjusted measure ((χ2=11.26, p<0.01). The median of R&D expenses 
scaled by total assets (R&D/AT) also declined over the period, and the decline was significant for both 
the unadjusted (χ2=9.60, p<0.01) and the industry-adjusted measure ((χ2=10.21, p<0.01). The median of 
R&D scaled by selling and administrative expenses also declined over the period. The decline is 
significant for both the unadjusted (χ2=4.93, p<0.05) and the industry-adjusted measure (χ2=4.17, p<0.05). 
In summary, the above results indicate a significant decline in R&D intensity for the defense firms from 
the high demand (1984-1989) to the low demand period (1993-1998). These results are consistent with 
our H1a, "the inhibiting view" that the decline in defense product demand over the period in general 
undermined the defense firms’ ability to innovate through investments in research and development.  
 
Results from Multivariate Regression Analyses 
The preliminary evidence from the median tests suggests that decline in defense product demand 
significantly undermined defense firms’ R&D investments. In the following section, we employ 
multivariate regression analysis to examine the effects of defense product demand decline on the defense 
firms. In the regression analysis, we included a control group of Compustat firms that had the same first 
two digits of SIC industry codes with our sample defense firms but reported no sales to the government in 
1989. The control group is used to control for the change in R&D intensity due to confounding factors 
common to the respective industries in which the sample defense firms operate. The following regression 
model is employed: 
 
Dependent Variable = β0 + β1 Post + β2 Post*Control + β3 Control + β4 Defense Dependence 
                                    β5 Industry + β6 Sale + ε                                                                          (1) 
 
where ε is a random error term.   
 
Dependent variables are the three variables for R&D intensity (R&D/AT, R&D/Sale and 
R&D/S&GA). Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in the low-demand period (1993 
to 1998); it equals 0 for the high demand period (1984 to 1989). Control is a dummy variable which 
equals 0 if the observation is one of our sample defense firms; otherwise, it equals 1. R&D intensity for a 
firm's defense business could be systematically different from that for its commercial business 
(Lichtenberg, 1987). Thus, Defense dependence, which is measured as a firm’s sales to the government 
scaled by its total net sale, is included to control the degree to which a firm depends on defense business 
for its total sales. Industry variable, measured based on a firm's first two digits of SIC code, is used to 
control the effect of industry characteristics on R&D intensity. Sale variable (in constant 1998 dollars) is 
included to control size effects. The definitions of the variables are included in Table 2. The coefficient of 
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the Post variable indicates the difference in R&D intensity from the high demand (1984-1989) to the low 
demand period (1993-1998) for the sample defense firms. The coefficient of the Control variable 
indicates the difference between the sample defense firms and non-defense firms in the control group for 
the high demand period. The coefficient of the interaction term Post×Control indicates the difference 
between the sample defense firms and non-defense control firms in the change of R&D intensity from 
high demand to low demand. 
Our sample defense firms tend to be relatively large in sizes. The minimum values of total assets and 
net sales are 97 million and 260 million, respectively (both in 1998 constant dollars). The non-defense 
firms with the same first two digits of SIC codes in the control group include many firms of small sizes. 
To improve the comparability of the sample defense firms and the control group, we exclude the 
observations with total assets and net sales smaller than 97 million and 260 million (in 1998 constant 
dollars), respectively. Different from median test, regression analysis is subject to the influence of 
extreme values. Thus, we trimmed the largest 3% of the three R&D intensity variables to address the 
undue effect of extreme values in the dependent variables. 
 
TABLE 4 
REGRESSION ESTIMATIONS RESULTS FOR TESTING THE HYPOTHESES a  
 
 R&D Intensity 
Dependent 
Variables R&D/AT R&D/SALE R&D/S&GA 
Independent 
Variables Coeff. Coeff. Coefficients 
  (t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.) 
Constant 0.0465*** 0.0392*** 0.2048*** 
  (12.33) (10.49) (16.92) 
Post -0.0119*** -0.0073** -0.0197* 
  (-3.56) (-2.18) (-1.78) 
Post × Control 0.0173*** 0.0135*** 0.0419*** 
  (4.90) (3.84) (3.60) 
Control -0.0133*** -0.0090*** -0.0422*** 
 (-3.94) (-2.69) (-3.89) 
Defense 
Dependence -0.0116** -0.0228*** 0.0522*** 
  (-2.12) (-4.21) (2.85) 
SALEb  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0019*** 
 (3.07) (4.86) (10.99) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
     
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.017 0.049 
F-Statistics 9.54*** 15.70*** 42.04*** 
N 5060 5060 4768 
*, **, *** represent significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
a. We exclude the observations in the largest 3% of the respectively R&D 
intensity variables to address the potential undue influence of ext reme values. 
b. in billions of 1998 constant dollars 
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Table 4 reports the results for the regression tests. For the R&D intensity variables (R&D/AT, 
R&D/SALE and R&D/S&GA), the coefficients for the Post variable are significantly negative (t= –3.56, 
–2.18, and –1.78; significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively). The results indicate that the sample 
defense firms experienced a significant decline in R&D intensity from the high demand (1984-1989) to 
the low demand period (1993 to 1998). The coefficients for the Control variable are significantly negative 
for all the three dependent variables at 1% level. The results suggest on average the sample defense firms 
have higher R&D intensity than the non-defense firms. The coefficients for Post×Control are significantly 
positive (t=4.90, 3.84, and 3.60, respectively; all significant at 1% level), which indicates that change in 
R&D intensity is significantly more negative for sample defense firms than that for the non-defense firms 
in the control group. Further examination (not reported in the table) indicates that for the non-defense 
firms in the control group, the coefficients of the Post variable (coeff.=0.0054 for R&D/AT, 0.0062 for 
R&D/SALE, and 0.0222 for R&D/XSGA) are significantly positive (t=4.84, 5.60, 6.10, respectively; all 
significant at 1% level). The results suggest that the non-defense firms in the control group actually 
experienced significant increases in R&D intensity over the period of 1984 to 1998, which is consistent 
with the general trend of increasing knowledge-orientation for U.S. economy. In summary, the evidence 
above suggests that declined demand in defense products significantly undermined defense firms’ 
investments in R&D for innovations, which is consistent with our H1a, the “inhibiting view” and 
inconsistent with the competing "stimulating view".   
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
This study investigated the effects of product demand declines subsequent to the end of the Cold War 
on defense firms’ profitability, financial flexibility, capital intensity, operating efficiency, and R&D 
intensity. We found that from the high demand (1984-1989) to the low demand period (1993 to 1998), 
defense firms in general experienced a substantial decline in profitability as measured by return on assets, 
which could be attributable to their lower efficiency of using assets to produce sales for the low demand 
period. The challenging environment faced by the defense firms also put some stress on their financial 
flexibility. As a response to the declined defense product demand, the defense firms downsized their 
capital investments and workforce. However, we also found that defense firms, although they experienced 
significant declines in sales to defense markets, generally managed to maintain their size in terms of total 
assets and net sales by diversifying into commercial markets or shifting their sources to their existing 
commercial business. Consistent with Dial and Murphy (1995), our evidence suggests that a significant 
portion of defense firms might not have downsized and restructured sufficiently, which might be at the 
sacrifice of profitability and operating efficiency.  
We also found that defense firms in general experienced a significant decline in R&D intensity from 
the high demand (1984-1989) to the low demand period (1993-1998). This trend is in contrast with their 
respective industry non-defense peers which experienced a significant increase in R&D intensity over the 
period as the U.S. economy has become increasingly intellectual oriented. Our results suggest that the 
declines in defense product demand significantly undermined the defense firms’ motivation and capacity 
to investing in R&D for technological innovations. The inhibiting view in the organization decline 
literature could better explain defense firms’ responses to product demand decline than the stimulating 
view.  As pointed out by Harbison, Moorman, Jones, and Kim (2000), the substantial lowered demand for 
defense products lead to a risky consequence for defense industry --- “the industry is eating its ‘seed corn’ 
in terms of reinvesting in innovations”. Given the high importance of R&D innovations to the national 
security of the U.S. (Rogerson 1989), this might have produced undesired effects.  
Defense industry is highly regulated with only one major buyer which is also the regulator: the 
Department of Defense. The contingency framework developed by Mone, McKinley, and Barker (1998) 
suggests that the effect of product demand decline on innovations depends on the institutions in which a 
company operates. Firms in regulated industries could face legal and political constraints that limit 
managers’ capacity to seek innovative solutions. Regulations could also motivate firms in the regulated 
industries, especially defense industry, to compete in alternative ways such as active lobbying. This 
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potentially undermines defense firms’ incentive to cope with the declining product demand through 
innovations and improving operating efficiency.  
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. We treat all the sales to the government as defense sales since defense sales account for the majority 
portion of all the sales to the U.S. government for the firms in the list of index (Lichtenberg, 1992; 
McGowan and Vendrzyk, 2002).   
2. The reported R&D expenses do not include R&D expenditures funded by a firm’s customers including the 
Department of Defense. 
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APPENDIX 
 
SAMPLE DEFENSE FIRMS OF 1989 
 Company Name Primary SIC Code 
1 ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES INC 3724 
2 ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS INC 3480 
3 ARVIN INDUSTRIES INC 3714 
4 AVONDALE INDUSTRIES INC 3730 
5 BOEING CO 3721 
6 CBS CORP 3585 
7 CERIDIAN CORP 3571 
8 COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP 7373 
9 CONTEL CORP 4813 
10 CORDANT TECHNOLOGIES INC 3760 
11 CRAY RESEARCH 3571 
12 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT 3570 
13 DIRECTV GROUP INC 3812 
14 DYNCORP INC 8744 
15 E-SYSTEMS INC 3812 
16 EATON CORP 3714 
17 FMC CORP 2800 
18 GENCORP INC 3760 
19 GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP 3721 
20 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 3600 
21 GRUMMAN CORP 3721 
22 HARRIS CORP 3663 
23 HARSCO CORP 3440 
24 HENLEY GROUP INC/DEL 3821 
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25 HERCULES INC 2821 
26 HONEYWELL INC 3822 
27 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC 3724 
28 INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP 3570 
29 KAMAN CORP  -CL A 5080 
30 LITTON INDUSTRIES INC 3812 
31 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 3760 
32 LOGICON INC 7371 
33 LORAL CORP 3812 
34 LTV AEROSPACE & DEFENSE CO 3728 
35 LTV CORP 3312 
36 MARTIN MARIETTA CORP 3760 
37 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP 3721 
38 MORRISON KNUDSEN CORP OLD 1540 
39 MOTOROLA INC 3663 
40 NORTH AMERICAN PHILIPS CORP 3640 
41 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 3721 
42 OLIN CORP 2800 
43 OSHKOSH TRUCK CORP 3711 
44 PERKINELMER INC 8711 
45 RAYTHEON CO 3812 
46 ROCKWELL AUTOMATION 3760 
47 SCIENCE APPLCTNS INTL 8700 
48 SEQUA CORP  -CL A 3724 
49 SUNDSTRAND CORP 3728 
50 TENNECO AUTOMOTIVE INC 3523 
51 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 3674 
52 TEXTRON INC 3720 
53 TRACOR INC 3728 
54 TRW INC 3760 
55 UNISYS CORP 3570 
56 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 3724 
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